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Since the Gulf War began, commentators have been fal I Ing over one another 
to pour scorn on the gap between the European Community's heady 
aspirations and its performance when the chips are down. What good Is 
al I that rhetoric about common values, they say, If the Community cannot 
del lver? One day the Twelve were standing four-square and united behind 
the UN resolutions, agreeing that no purpose could be served by further 
talks. Next day a Member State launched a high-prof I le Initiative 
without even the pretence of consultation with partners. When the war 
actua I I y began the er It I cs were qu I ck to pounce on what they saw as a 
wide divergence between the show of common polltlcal support for the 
International effort, and the very different levels of financial and 
mi I ltary commitment. What price a common foreign pot Icy now? 
It Is true that the Gulf has brutally exposed the I Imitations that 
currently frustrate common action by the Community. Jacques Delors 
adm It ted as much in the European Par I I ament I ast week. Doug I as Hurd was 
restrained in describing the Community's response as patchy. 
Yet It Is easy to overstate the extent of Community disarray : and there 
Is danger of drawing the wrong conclusions. It Is no use criticizing the 
Community for not being what Its Member States have so far not wanted It 
to be. 
The truth is that the Community responded quickly and effectively where 
It was competent to do so. Even before the UN Security Councl I Imposed 
comprehensive sanctions, the Community had agreed an embargo and an asset 
freeze. Once the UN did act the Community had not only prepared but 
enacted the necessary Implementing leglslatlon for the embargo within 48 
hours . Since then, the Community has been active In channel I Ing 
emergency a Id to refugees , and agreement has been reached on g Iv Ing 
balance of payments support to the countries around Iraq which are 
hardest hit by their support for the International effort. 
The problems have arisen In matters of foreign pol Icy, where the 
Community as such Is !lQ.1 competent . True, there are now structures of 
coordination between the Twelve Member States . These structures have 
been brought within the Treaty of Rome, and cooperation has come on a 
long way In recent years. But the structures are st 111 Inadequate fo r 
the traffic they are expected to bear. Matters of defence fal I entirely 
outside their scope. 
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Ah ha ! say the critics. You claim the problem Is merely Institutional. 
But what good are Rolls Royce Institutions If there is no underlying 
unity of purpose ? My reply Is that the two are not distinct. Common 
pol lcles, Jn any field, do not spring out ful Jy-armed, I Ike Athena. The 
whole history of the Single Market has demonstrated that Joint pol lcles 
have to be fashioned. Common pol lcles need strong common mechanisms for 
their creation. And these mechanisms have to be tested over time to 
discover their ful I potential. 
That Is why the work on foreign pol Icy which is taking place within the 
Inter-Governmental Conference launched In December - far from being 
rendered Irrelevant by the developments of the last few weelcs - has 
become more relevant than ever. The Community must do everything In Its 
power to develop a pol ltlcal contribution which wl 11 match Its economic 
and commercial role. This wl I I not happen overnight, and It Is certainly 
Important not to give up the ex 1st Ing way of hand I Ing er lses before 
something better Is put In Its place. 
I hope, therefore, that the Inter-Governmental Conference, Insofar as It 
relates to foreign pol Icy, may achieve : 
First, the full incorporation of political and security cooperation Into 
the European Community. The careful distinctions we have to make at 
present between positions and pol lcles of the Twelve and of the Community 
proper are tiresome to sustain, and they reduce our Joint Impact . 
Second, the abandonment of I Imitative definitions of the areas of pol Icy 
which are accepted within the ambit of the Community ' s pol itlcal 
cooperation. The Community must be free to discuss what It wants, 
Including mi I ltary and defence Issues. 
Third, stronger Institutional mechanisms for achieving common positions 
and Initiatives. The role of the Commission, of the European Council of 
Heads of Government, of the Councl I of Ministers - whether meeting at the 
level of Foreign Ministers, or even of Defence Ministers - al I need 
proper definition . And Ministers need adequate support from senior 
officials In preparing Joint decisions (as they have In other areas of 
Community business) . 
Fourth, agreement that the European Counci I of 
acting by consensus, may determine specific areas 
should agree genuinely common foreign pol Icy . 
Heads of Government, 
in which the Community 
Fifth, the elimination from the Treaty of Rome of the Article which 
excludes arms production and trade from the normal rules and disc Ip I Ines 
of the market. At present, a simple reference to national Interest 
enables Member States discriminate against defence products coming from 
elsewhere In the Community, In a way that Is forbidden for all other 
goods. Th Is has been damag Ing to us a II, and cont r I bu ted to the so-
ca J Jed "one-way street" of US arms sales to NATO. It has meant that our 
armed forces have not always been able to get the best value for money. 
Most important I y. I hope the I nter-Governmenta I Conference may at I ast 
begin to shape the European pi I lar of NATO. For decades It could be said 
of European defence cooperation, as Mark Twain said of the weather, that 
everyone ta llced about It , but no-one did anything about It. Now - Jn the 
context of NATO and a cont I nu Ing US presence In Europe - we need to 
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deve I op a European Defence Commun It y based on the European Commun It Y 
Itself, which would replace the Eurogroup and the Independent European 
Programme Group within NATO. Jn the first Instance such a Community 
would J lmlt Itself to pol Icy coordination. Joint research. defence trade 
Issues, and so on. It would, most emphat lcal Jy, be part of NATO. It 
would constitute the long-sought European wing within the At I ant ic 
Al I lance. 
conclusion 
This Is a tl me when the European Commun It y shou Id show proper hum I I It y -
recognizing the I lmlts of what It can currently offer to Europe, and to 
Its members . But nor should we postpone decisions about future foreign 
pol Icy coordination which are now more urgent than ever. 
It seems c I ear that one consequence of the drama t I c deve I opment s In 
Europe and the Soviet Union over the past 18 months Is that the US WI I I 
scale down Its presence here. I suspect that this trend may be 
accelerated In the aftermath of the Gulf War. There Is no point In the 
countr les of Europe cal I Ing one another names, blaming each other for 
recent discord. Rather, we must redouble our efforts to create the 
Inst I tut ions which wl I I enable us to pursue more coherent European pol Icy 
In the future. and help us to determine the course of events which may 
affect us more closely than anyone else. 
Paradoxical Jy, by achieving greater coherence and unity, we are I llcely to 
strengthen the hand of those In America who want to maintain their 
comm I tmen t to an act I ve re I e In Europe . By the same token, we w I I I 
weaken the arguments of those who are Impatient with Europe's Inability 
to play a proper role In looking after Its own Interests, and who are 
therefore tempted to reduce America's commitment to Europe. 
